Knights, knaves or pawns? Human behaviour and social policy by Le Grand, Julian
Knights, Knaves or Pawns? Human Behaviour and
Social Policy
JULIAN LE GRAND* 1
(Received 20.7.95; Accepted 27.10.95)
ABSTRACT
There are two fundamental changes currently under way in the wel-
fare state. These are the development of quasi-markets in welfare provi-
sion, and the supplementation of ‘fiscal’ welfare by ‘legal’ welfare: poli-
cies that rely on redistributing income through regulation and other
legal devices, instead of through the tax and social security system.
This article argues that these changes are in part the result of a funda-
mental shift in policy-makers’ beliefs concerning human motivation
and behaviour. People who finance, operate and use the welfare state
are no longer assumed to be either public spirited altruists (knights) or
passive recipients of state largesse (pawns); instead they are all consid-
ered to be in one way or another self-interested (knaves). However,
since neither the ‘new’ nor the ‘old’ set of assumptions are based on
evidence, policies based on the new set are as likely to fail as those
based on the old. What is needed are ‘robust’ policies that are not
dependent on any simple view of human behaviour.
‘In contriving any system of government, and fixing the several checks and controls of
the constitution, every man ought to be supposed a knave and to have no other end,
in all his actions, than private interest. By this interest, we must govern him and, by
means of it, notwithstanding his insatiable avarice and ambition, co-operate to the
public good.’ (David Hume, 1875, pp. 117–18)
‘If it is accepted that man has a sociological and biological need to help, then to deny
him opportunities to express this need is to deny him the freedom to enter into gift
relationships.’ (Richard Titmuss, 1971, p. 243)
There are two fundamental changes currently under way in the wel-
fare states of Britain and other developed countries, each rather dif-
ferent from the other. One – the replacement of the state provision of
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services by ‘quasi-market’ provision – is by now well known. It involves
the introduction of competition into the delivery of social services such
as education, health care and social care, and, as its label suggests, is
pro-market in nature. The second change has been less widely
remarked. It concerns the other side of the welfare state – social secur-
ity or, more generally, the redistribution of income – and may be
described as the supplementation of ‘fiscal’ by ‘legal’ welfare. Legal wel-
fare involves the use of regulation or legislation to intervene in market
outcome, and could be interpreted, at least in part, as anti-market.
Both of these developments raise interesting questions for social pol-
icy analysts. Why have they come about? To what extent are they a
response to the perceived failures in the old systems? If they are a
response to these failures, are they a good response? More generally, do
they represent a desirable set of developments accurately reflecting the
changing context in which welfare states find themselves, or are the
changes simply another symptom of the inexorable decline of state 
welfare?
Many of these issues have been discussed extensively elsewhere
(especially with respect to quasi-markets) and I shall not repeat all the
points made in those discussions here. Instead I want to use the fact of
these changes to develop an argument that I do not think has been
made before, at least not in this form; an argument that illuminates
both the ‘why’ and the ‘desirability’ questions with respect to the
changes, but one that also has broader implications for social policy in
general. This concerns the assumptions that underlie welfare policy
concerning the mainsprings of human behaviour.
More specifically, I argue that both the quasi-market and legal
changes in welfare systems are based on a particular view of human
motivation and behaviour, and that this view is rather different from
the assumptions concerning motivation that underlay older models of
welfare systems. However, neither this ‘new’ view nor the ‘older’
assumptions are likely to provide an adequate account of the way in
which people actually behave in welfare-relevant situations; hence wel-
fare systems based solely on one or the other are likely to fail. What is
needed are ‘robust’ welfare policies: ones that allow for the possibility
of different kinds of human motivation and hence have the potential
for more successful outcomes.
This is a broad canvas. Inevitably in places the argument is specu-
lative; equally inevitably it will involve both the caricaturing of distin-
guished thinkers’ arguments and the over-simplification of a complex
reality. However, it is hoped that the central ideas contain sufficient
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insight to justify their preliminary exposition here, and perhaps to
stimulate their subsequent development. 
The article begins with a brief exposition of the two sets of changes
that are our jumping-off point. The next section develops the main
argument, while the following two sections examine some possible
implications for policy. There is a brief conclusion.
Q UA S I -M A R K E T S
Throughout the development of British welfare policy, the state not
only financed the supply of social services such as education, health
care and social care, it provided them as well. That is, it owned and
operated most of the institutions and agencies that provided these ser-
vices, and employed the staff who worked in them. In many areas of
welfare it was effectively a large, monopoly provider and, as such,
inevitably attracted the kinds of criticisms that such organisations tend
to attract: that they are wasteful, inefficient and unresponsive to the
needs and wants of users. Partly in response to such criticisms, in the
late 1980s and early 1990s, state provision was systematically
replaced by a more market-oriented, competitive approach to service
delivery: the quasi-market.
In a quasi-market, the state retains control of finance, either by 
giving individuals vouchers or, more commonly, by appointing
informed agents to purchase services on behalf of final users. Examples
include vouchers for nursery education, open enrolment and formula
funding for primary and secondary education (effectively another form
of voucher), health commissions and GP fund-holders in the National
Health Service, and social service departments, and care managers in
community care. Provision of the service, on the other hand, is not
undertaken by the state, but is left to independent providers (profit and
non-profit) who compete with one another for the custom of pur-
chasers. Examples include hospital trusts, locally managed and opted
out schools, and private and voluntary residential homes for those in
need of social care. The intention behind the introduction of quasi-
markets is that the process of competition in provision will promote
efficiency and responsiveness, while the state can ensure equity
through judicious use of the mechanisms for financing purchasers. 
This process has been discussed in more detail elsewhere (Le Grand
and Bartlett, 1993; Glennerster and Le Grand, 1995) and I will 
not dwell further on it at this point. In the meantime let me describe
briefly another change that perhaps is only on the horizon at the
moment, but could become as significant for the social security side of
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the welfare state as the quasi-market developments have been for the
social services side: the growth of ‘legal’ welfare.
‘ L E G A L’  W E L FA R E
As many writers have pointed out,2 the postwar system of social secur-
ity was built on a number of fundamental assumptions concerning the
social and economic environment in which it would operate. First,
Keynesian macro-economic policies would ensure that there would be
full employment. Second, the family would continue to exist in broadly
its pre-war form, with a male bread-winner and a female home-maker
and child-carer (Glennerster, 1995, pp. 34–5: Lowe, 1993, pp. 33–55).
Third – and the centrality of this assumption has been less widely
remarked (but see Glennerster, 1995, p. 41) – there would be no fun-
damental shifts in ‘market’ inequality: the underlying differences in
income and wealth generated in the market and that the social secur-
ity system was in part designed to correct. In particular, earnings dif-
ferentials would remain unchanged, or, more likely, narrow as wide-
spread equality of educational opportunity ensured that job skills
became more widely diffused.
Recent reports from the Commission on Social Justice (1994) and 
the Joseph Rowntree Foundation (1995) have brought to the attention
of a wider public what economists and social policy analysts have
known for some time: that these assumptions no longer hold. Full
employment disappeared in the 1970s. There now appears to be a hard
core of long-term unemployed and a larger group of temporarily unem-
ployed, whose composition changes; although currently falling in size,
both groups remain stubbornly large (Commission on Social Justice,
1994, pp. 33–5; Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 1995, II, ch. 5). Women
have entered the labour force in large numbers; hence they are no
longer as available to look after children (or other dependants, such as
elderly relatives) (ibid.). Family break-up is widespread; and the number
of single-parent headed households is increasing sharply. And, perhaps
most profound of all, labour market inequality is widening dramatically.
As the Commission on Social Justice has noted (1994, p. 28):
For nearly forty years after the Second World War, the income gap between the richest
and the poorest in the UK gradually narrowed. That progress has now been reversed.
Today, the gap between the earnings of the highest-paid and those of the lowest-paid
workers is greater than at any time since records were first kept in 1886.
Awareness of the limitations of the social security system, and its
consequent inability to deal properly with the dramatic increases in
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inequality and poverty, has led to a growing interest in welfare inter-
ventions of a rather different kind. One, directed at wage inequality, is
the minimum wage, long advocated on the left, but now gaining sup-
port from a much wider group of labour market analysts (see, for
instance, Card and Krueger, 1995). Another, aimed at reducing unem-
ployment, is a legal limit on the working week, an approach now
attracting attention in the Netherlands and France. In Britain,
Australia and elsewhere, the financial difficulties of single parents are
being addressed by statutory bodies such as the Child Support Agency;
and in Britain measures have been proposed to make divorce more dif-
ficult, especially for couples with children. There is also a developing
interest in Anglo-Saxon countries in the obligation alimentaire: the prin-
ciple, common in continental Europe, that adults have a financial
obligation to support their elderly parents. Singapore is now consider-
ing introducing a similar scheme, but with the obligation being legally
enforced. 
What all these apparently rather disparate measures have in com-
mon is that they do not wait until income is ‘delivered’ by the market
to families or households, and then, like the current welfare state,
redistribute it through fiscal measures such as taxes and social security
benefits. Instead they use legal measures to intervene directly in the
process by which people get an income – directly in the primary
income distribution. So minimum wages and limits on working hours
affect the amounts that employees obtain from their work; the Child
Support Agency, restrictions on divorce and the obligation alimentaire
compel people to support their dependants directly. In other words,
such measures deliver welfare through legislation or regulation and not
through the fiscal system: hence their description as forms of ‘legal’
welfare.3
Again there is not the space here to discuss this phenomenon in
detail; I hope to return to it in future work. Instead, let us turn to the
main focus of this article: the difference between the assumptions con-
cerning human motivation and behaviour that underlay these ‘new’
forms of welfare and those that informed the ‘old’ welfare state that
they may be replacing. 
K N I G H T S ,  K NAV E S O R PAW N S?
Assumptions concerning human motivation and behaviour are the
key to the design of social policy. Policy-makers fashion policies on
the assumption that those affected by the policies will behave in cer-
tain ways and they will do so because they have certain motivations.
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Sometimes the assumptions concerning motivation and behaviour 
are explicit; more often they are implicit, reflecting the unconscious
values or beliefs of the policy-makers concerned. Conscious or not,
the assumptions will determine the way that welfare institutions are
constructed. So, for instance, a welfare state constructed on the
assumption that people are motivated primarily by their own self-
interest – that they are, in the words of David Hume quoted at the
beginning of this paper, knaves4 – would be quite different from one
constructed on the assumption that people are predominantly public-
spirited or altruistic – that they are what we might term knights in
contrast to knaves. Similarly, if policy-makers work on the assumption
that people are essentially passive or unresponsive – neither knights
or knaves, but pawns – then again the policy concerned would be
quite different from one designed on the assumption that human
beings respond actively to the incentive structures with which they
are faced.5
It might also be noted that these assumptions – or, more precisely,
the relationships between the assumptions and the realities of human
motivation – are crucial to the success or otherwise of the policies con-
cerned. Hume was keen to point out that policies designed on the
assumption that people are knights are likely to have disastrous conse-
quences if in fact they are predominantly knaves. But, as Richard
Titmuss was anxious to emphasise in The Gift Relationship (whence
came the quotation at the beginning of the article), the same is true for
policies fashioned on the basis of a belief that people are knaves if the
consequence is to suppress their natural altruistic impulses.
We shall return to these points later. In the meantime, the import-
ance of the beliefs about human behaviour involved in policy-making
can be illustrated by comparing those implicit in the old-style welfare
state that preceded the changes discussed above, and those implicit in
the new, post-reform, welfare systems. Inevitably given their implicit
nature, it is difficult fully to document any claims that one might 
wish to make about these beliefs by reference to explicit statements by
policy-makers or others; hence such claims must at times remain more
at the level of assertion than of scientifically established fact. However,
it is hoped that the rather stylised set of pictures that are painted here
have enough accuracy so as not seriously to distort the scenes that
they are trying to represent.6
Lowe (1993) has argued that there were two approaches to welfare
that characterised the pre-reform British welfare state: the reluctant
collectivists, pre-eminent among whom were Beveridge and Keynes,
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and the democratic socialists, who included Marshall, Titmuss and
Crosland. Of these, he argued that:
despite the predominant influence of Beveridge and Keynes in the early postwar years,
it was the democratic socialists which gave the British welfare state its unique inter-
national reputation. At home these ideals also infused the welfare legislation of the
1954–61 Labour governments and provided the logic for further advances which the
Conservative ministers struggled to refute. (Lowe 1993, pp. 18–20) 
In Lowe’s view, it was the social democratic approach, albeit tempered by
that of the reluctant collectivists, which determined the evolution of the
postwar welfare state: ‘social democracy had history on its side’ (ibid.).
What then were the assumptions concerning human behaviour
implicit in the ‘democratic socialist’ welfare state? In trying to answer
this question, it is useful to distinguish three sets of actors. First, there
were those who operated the welfare state: the politicians and civil ser-
vants who devised its policies, the managers who administered it, and
the professionals and others who delivered its services. Second, there
were those who paid for welfare: taxpayers under the fiscal welfare sys-
tem. Third, there were those who received the benefits of the welfare
state: social security recipients, doctors’ patients, school pupils and
their parents, council house tenants and so on.
Democratic socialists assumed that the state and its agents were 
both competent and benevolent (Lowe, 1993, p. 23). Hence it followed
that the first group – those who operated the welfare state – could be
trusted to work primarily in the public interest (Donnison, 1982, pp.
20–1). Professionals, such as doctors and teachers, were thought to be
primarily motivated by their professional ethic and hence to be con-
cerned only with the interests of the people they were serving.6
Similarly, politicians, civil servants, and bureaucrats and managers
were supposed accurately to define social and individual needs in the
areas concerned, and to operate services that did the best possible job
of meeting those needs from available resources.
The second group – the taxpayers – were also assumed to be part 
of the collective view that ‘social justice would be guaranteed by a pre-
dominant altruism’ (Lowe, 1993, p. 19) and hence to accept a growing
burden of progressive taxes (Donnison, 1982, pp. 20–1).8 More specifi-
cally, it was assumed that the better-off would not only co-operate in
collectivist enterprises such as national insurance and social services
but also acquiesce in paying redistributive taxation that helped the dis-
advantaged, either because they empathised with the latter’s plight or
because they saw it as part of their civic responsibility to do so.
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The democratic socialists did not assume that the third group – 
individuals in receipt of the benefits of the welfare state – were active
altruists. Rather, the latter were considered to be essentially passive:
pawns, not knights. Those who used social services were supposed to
be content with a universal, often fairly basic, standard of service. So
Titmuss, for instance, spoke of the desirability of ‘one publicly approved
standard of service’ (1968, p. 195). In practice, with respect to the
National Health Service, for instance, this meant that patients were
supposed to live up to their appellation and be patient. They were to
wait patiently in queues at GPs’ surgeries or at outpatient clinics; if
they needed further treatment, they had to wait for their turn on hos-
pital waiting lists. When the time arrived for them actually to go to
hospital, they were supposed cheerfully to accept being on a public
ward, being served horrible food and, most significantly, being treated
by doctors too busy, or too elevated, to have time to explain what was
happening to them. As Klein has put it, in the early model of the NHS:
‘it would be the doctor’s judgement which would determine who
should get what…It was the experts who determined the need for
health care, frame the appropriate priorities and implement their poli-
cies universalistically throughout the NHS’ (Klein, 1995, p. 248).9
Similarly, the parents of children in state schools were expected to
trust the professionals, and to accept that teachers knew what was best
for their children. The period between 1944 and 1975 was identified
as the ‘golden age of teacher control’.10 Moreover, as with the NHS,
especially following the comprehensive reforms of the mid-1960s, par-
ents were supposed to concur that ‘the overriding objective in [educa-
tion policy] was equality’ (Lowe, 1993, p. 203) and hence to accept
whatever degree of uniformity of educational provision that attaining
this objective required.
Council house tenants were expected to be grateful for the privilege
they had been accorded in being granted a tenancy (Dunleavy, 1981,
pp. 28–33). Their accommodation was standardised, with heavy
restrictions as to their freedom of action over what could be done with
it.11 And again the experts were presumed to know best about the
housing that people wanted.12
At least for some of the democratic socialists, similar views charac-
terised their beliefs about social security recipients. As Deacon has
recently argued, Titmuss, for instance, assumed that the beneficiaries
of social security had very little choice at all; that the economic and
social system was so all powerful that they were simply its victims; that
they had no freedom of action and hence were simply passive recipi-
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ents of state largesse (Deacon, 1993).13 However, it has to be acknowl-
edged that this view does not seem to characterise the actual delivery
of social security policy. The postwar history of the latter (and indeed
the entire history of social security) is peppered with the development
of different forms of checks and balances to control the perceived prob-
lem of the people variously termed the workshy, loafers or scroungers
(Deacon, 1976; Bryson and Jacobs, 1992; Jacobs, 1994). Here there
seems to have been a constant tension between the assumption that
welfare recipients were basically passive – pawns – and the assumption
that they were active agents in pursuit of their own self-interest:
knaves. 
Social security, therefore, is perhaps a partial exception. But it is not
implausible to describe the bundle of implicit assumptions concerning
human behaviour that characterised the rest of the democratic socialist
welfare state as one designed to be financed and operated by knights,
for the benefit of pawns. 
However, recent years have seen serious assaults on all of the
assumptions that underlay the democratic socialist welfare state
(Glennerster, 1995, pp. 193–5; Lowe, 1993, pp. 23–7; Timmins, 1995,
Part V). The notion that, for the sake of the collectivity, everyone would
passively accept standardised, relatively low levels of services was chal-
lenged by studies showing that in key areas of welfare the middle
classes extracted at least as much if not more than the poor in terms of
both the quantity and quality of service (Le Grand, 1982). More gener-
ally, it became increasingly apparent that many people – particularly,
but not exclusively, the middle classes – wanted different kinds and dif-
ferent levels of service. Richard Titmuss himself may have enjoyed
being in a public ward (Titmuss, 1974, p. 151) but many people did
not. The length of waiting lists for medical treatment became a peren-
nial political issue. Many of the better off put their children in private
schools and took out private health insurance; many more subscribed
to occupational pensions (although often this was a condition of ser-
vice). The consensus supporting comprehensive education began to
break down, with influential voices encouraging an end to teacher
control over the curriculum, a return to selection, traditional teaching
methods and a focus on excellence (Timmins, 1995, pp. 318–29). As
council estates declined and tenants felt increasingly powerless, owner-
occupation became overwhelmingly the preferred form of housing
tenure (Power, 1995, pp. 212–14). 
The assumption that knightly behaviour characterised those who
worked within the institutions of the welfare state proved even more
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vulnerable. Fuelled in part by people’s experience both of dealing with,
and of working within, the welfare bureaucracies, scepticism grew con-
cerning the belief that bureaucrats and civil servants necessarily oper-
ated in the public interest, and that professionals were only concerned
with the welfare of their clients (Glennerster, 1995, p. 193). Instead,
there was an increasing acceptance of the argument of the public
choice school of economists and political scientists that the behaviour
of public officials and professionals could be better understood, if the
assumption was made that they were largely self-interested (Lowe,
1993, pp. 22–3).14
The idea that knightly behaviour characterises those who pay for
welfare was also challenged. Goodin and Dryzek (1987), and, more
comprehensively, Baldwin (1990), argued that the postwar growth of
tax and social insurance funded welfare states in a wide variety of
developed countries was not the outcome of altruistic gestures by the
better-off; rather it was directly related to the self-interest of the middle
classes. Econometric studies by Peltzman (1980) and Pampel and
Williamson (1989) came to similar conclusions. A more micro-level
study undertaken by Winter and myself of changes in public expendi-
ture and tax reliefs under the first Thatcher administration, based on
the assumption that politicians were vote-maximising, found a pattern
of change that unequivocally favoured the better-off (Le Grand and
Winter, 1987).
Even more recently, tax-payer resistance to redistributive welfare 
has become an accepted political fact, on the left as well as the right.
For instance, Piachaud argued in a recent Fabian pamphlet that ‘there
is now virtually no likelihood of further substantial redistribution of
income through taxes and social security benefits’ (1993, p. 3); a
judgement he based not on technical impossibility or social undesirabil-
ity, but simply on political feasibility. Field has gone further, claiming
that politicians who argue that the middle class will support redistribu-
tion to the poor are a ‘public menace, distracting from the real task’
(1995, pp. 1–2).
Finally, the idea that people in receipt of social benefits are pawns,
and that they do not respond to any incentives or disincentives built
into the system has also been vigorously assaulted. Again, although
the assault began on the Right, with Murray‘s book Losing Ground
(1984) as a notable example, it has been taken up in other parts of the
political spectrum; see, for instance, Etzioni’s The Spirit of Community
(1994) and the works of Deacon (1993) and Field (1995) already
mentioned.
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How does all this relate to the growth of quasi-markets and the
growth of interest in legal welfare? Both these phenomena can be
viewed in some sense as the replacement of what might be called
knight-and-pawn strategies with knavish ones. Thus fiscal welfare –
welfare based on taxation and social security – involves a system of
redistribution whose long-term sustainability depended on people’s
sense of altruism, or at the least of collectivity. Legal welfare, on the
other hand, is a redistributive mechanism where specific groups of indi-
viduals are identified as having responsibility for redistributing to
another group and who are then, in case they knavishly duck out of
those responsibilities, coerced by legal means to make the appropriate
transfer. Thus poverty due to low pay is assumed to be the outcome of
employers knavishly exploiting their employees; hence a minimum
wage is introduced to transfer income from employers to employees
(the fact that in practice minimum wages actually transfer incomes in
more complicated ways than that is irrelevant since we are only con-
cerned here with the perceptions of the relevant policy-makers and
their supporters). Similarly, instead of viewing the children of single
mothers as part of a collective responsibility and to be paid for accord-
ingly, they are regarded as their father’s responsibility; and, again to
avoid fathers knavishly ducking their duties, their incomes are directly
targeted as the source of maintenance by the Child Support Agency.
The knavish strategy implicit in the quasi-market agenda is rather
different. This is not simply a coercive mechanism to repress knavery;
rather it is an attempt to harness the knavery – or, to put it less pejora-
tively, the self-interest – of those working in the system to the public
good. As with ordinary markets, quasi-markets are supposed to display
the workings of Adam Smith’s Invisible Hand, whereby, simply through
pursuing their own advantage, suppliers are led to contribute to
socially desirable ends. Thus managers and doctors working in trust
hospitals that are losing money are assumed, in their own self-interest,
to become more responsive to the wishes and wants of their purchasers
and the people they represent. They will also strive to be more efficient
and less wasteful in their use of resources so as to ensure they stay
within budget (or make a surplus, if they are allowed to keep it).
Schools will be more sensitive to parents, for fear that they will other-
wise take their child away – or not apply in the first place – and the
school budget will suffer. And they too will have an incentive to be
more efficient.
So part of the why question – why these new forms of welfare devel-
oped when they did – can be explained as a reaction to what might be
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termed a loss of faith in the benevolence of human nature. This switch
in belief – that people are closer to being knaves than being either
knights or pawns – led policy-makers to switch welfare strategies: a
switch that it is probably only slightly caricaturing to describe as one
from policies designed to be financed, and staffed by knights and used
by pawns, to ones financed, staffed and used by knaves.
W E L FA R E S T R ATAG I E S
So much for the why question. What of the desirability question: are
these ‘knaves’ strategies’, as Pettit (1996) has called these kinds of
institutions, desirable? In his recent book Making Welfare Work, Field
has argued that, for welfare reform,
the starting block is a willing acceptance of the fundamental role self-interest plays in
human motivation. The job of a welfare reconstruction is to plan a series of benefit
reforms which allow self-interest to operate in a way that simultaneously promotes the
public good. (1995, p. 20)
A central question is therefore: are Field and the others who think like
him and who, by implication, do not think like the democratic social-
ists, right, while Titmuss, Marshall and the other democratic socialists
are wrong?
There have been enormous amounts written on the merits and
demerits of some of the specific policy instruments we are talking
about, such as purchaser/provider splits in the health service, mini-
mum wages as a means for helping the poor, or the Child Support
Agency. They cannot be all summarised here; nor would that be appro-
priate for this article. Rather my intention is to continue with the more
general theme concerning the relative merits of strategies based on dif-
ferent assumptions about human behaviour. 
Now one might at first think that the most obvious way of settling
any debate about the merits of these two kinds of policies is to ascer-
tain which of the assumptions on which it is based are correct. Are
people in fact knaves, knights or pawns – or some combination of all
three? We have seen that there has been a shift in belief among many
decision-makers and opinion-formers towards the view that, in most
situations of relevance to welfare, the individuals concerned are more
likely to be self-interested than public-spirited; but is this change in
belief well founded?
Even to ask these questions is to invite the charge of over-simplifi-
cation. Perhaps in consequence, few of the protagonists in the debate
refer to psychological evidence concerning what does actually motivate
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people in different situations. It may be that such evidence does not
exist; or, perhaps more likely, that such evidence that does exist is not
amenable to simple interpretation. Nor, so far as I can ascertain, have
there been many attempts to test the theories derived from the different
assumptions by deriving predictions from the theories and testing them
against the empirical record. 
So for the moment I think we have to assume that we do not know
whether, in welfare-relevant situations, people actually will behave as
knights, knaves, pawns or indeed in some more complex fashion. What
does that imply about the appropriate welfare strategy to adopt? 
One possible implication is that, in a situation of ignorance con-
cerning human motivation, it would be safest to adopt public policies
based on the knaves strategy. For a knaves strategy will do little harm if
people are actually knights; but a knights strategy could be disastrous
if people are actually knaves. 
That a knights strategy will fail if most people are in fact knaves is
reasonably self-evident. That a knaves strategy could work even if most
people are knights, is perhaps less obvious, and is perhaps best illus-
trated by an example. Take a particular group of people involved in
some welfare institution, say doctors in a hospital. Now suppose that
most of these doctors are in fact knights, doing the best they can for
their patients, often at considerable personal sacrifice. Moreover, the
reward structure of the hospital is actually based on that assumption,
with automatic payment of salaries and with no monitoring of doctor
behaviour or performance review. But suppose, too, that there are a
few consultants who are knaves, spending their time on the golf course
or managing their investment portfolio, to the obvious detriment of
their patients; behaviour that, despite the fact that it is only character-
istic of a small number of doctors, is damaging the performance and
reputation of the hospital as a whole, and thereby threatening its sur-
vival.
Now suppose in this situation that a system is introduced of perform-
ance-related pay. Since they are not motivated by economic self-inter-
est, this will leave the knights’ motivational structure untouched: they
will still derive the same reward as before from doing good to patients.
They will therefore carry on undertaking to the best of their ability all
the activities that are part of what they perceive as their duty to
patients. The knaves, on the other hand, will see that it is now in their
self-interest to perform their duties properly and will react accordingly.
What the new structure will have done, therefore, is bring the knaves
into line, ensuring that they perform as least as well as the knights.
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Everybody, knights and knaves, are now performing to the best of their
ability; and the hospital is saved.
However, in practice things may not always be that simple. The 
principal problem with the example is that it assumes there will be no
impact of the introduction of the knave strategy on knightly behaviour.
More specifically, the assumption is that, after the introduction of per-
formance-related pay the knights will carry on as before; only knaves
are affected. But this may not be the case: the introduction of a knave-
directed strategy may make the knights behave more knavishly
(Goodin, 1996, pp. 41–2; Pettit, 1996, pp. 72–5). A knightly doctor
whose pay rises dramatically as a result of the introduction of perfor-
mance-related pay might wonder whether she had not been selling
herself short under the old regime or putting in an excessive effort.
Further (again following Pettit, 1996), thinking about these questions
may make her start paying attention to the promotion of her own self-
advantage in the new situation.
Of course, this is similar to a central point in Titmuss’ The Gift
Relationship. It will be recalled that this was written partly in response
to an Institute of Economic Affairs publication, by two health econo-
mists, Cooper and Culyer (1968). This advocated the supplementation
of the British system of blood donation with a market system, involv-
ing, among other things, paying potential ‘donors’ for their blood.
Titmuss argued, I think convincingly, that, in a system where people
give blood and do so primarily for altruistic reasons, then the intro-
duction of a system of payment for blood may make those voluntarily
contributing their blood reconsider their position and perhaps reduce
their contribution or even stop altogether.
Now it could be argued that, in one sense, even if something like 
this does occur in these situations, it does not matter. Even if the intro-
duction of a knaves strategy does have the consequence of turning
knights into knaves, then, so long as the incentives for knaves are the
right ones, performance will continue to improve. For the newly 
created knaves will respond to the self-interested incentive structure in
the same way as the old established knaves: hence the outcome will be
the same as if they had remained knights.
But there are two objections to this kind of argument. First, even if
the eventual outcome is the same, there is something distasteful about
setting up a system that turns knights into knaves. Our society regards
altruistic or public-spirited behaviour as morally superior to self-inter-
ested behaviour and deliberately to encourage the latter at the expense
of the former seems perverse. Second, the argument assumes that the
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knaves strategy is watertight; that there is no way of getting round the
system in a way that furthers self-interest but on this occasion at the
expense of the public good. So, for instance, a system of performance-
related pay requires reliable and accurate procedures for measuring
and monitoring performance; one that cannot be fiddled to indicate
better performance than is actually happening. But – as is apparent
from the example – watertight systems are not always easy to con-
struct, or maintain. So I am not convinced that the answer to the
problem of our ignorance about human motivation lies in the whole-
sale adoption of knaves strategies.
A second possibility is to adopt or to continue with knights strate-
gies, and to try by other means to ensure that people actually behave
more like knights. This is close to the views of another new entrant to
the ‘vision’ industry: Amitai Etzioni and his communitarian movement
(1994). Etzioni argues that, in our present society, individuals are
much more concerned with their rights than with their responsibilities:
with their own needs rather than the needs of others. In his view, 
people need to be re-educated in the civic virtues; in the language of
this article, they need to be converted – or maybe re-converted – from
knaves into knights. 
Etzioni is vague as to precisely how this is to be done. But it seems
that legal welfare could be viewed as a useful tool for this purpose. Of
course in one sense it is a device for making knaves behave like knights
through coercion. Through minimum wages and maximum working
weeks, legal welfare forces employers to pay decent wages and not to
over-work their employees; the Child Support Agency compels errant
fathers to meet their child maintenance responsibilities. However, legal
welfare could also have a more positive role as an expression of social
leadership. By indicating through the legal system social disapproval of
the practices concerned, it could help internalise that disapproval
within individuals, thus helping convert the knave into the knight.
RO BU S T W E L FA R E P O L I C I E S
A third approach, and one that in some ways seems preferable to rely-
ing on strategies that appeal either only to knaves or only to knights, is
to accept our ignorance about what actually motivates people and to
try to design what might be termed robust strategies: strategies or 
institutions that are robust to whatever assumption is made about
human motivation.15 Now this, of course, is far from easy. But, to show
that it is not impossible, let me give four illustrations, two of existing
policies and two proposals for reform.
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The first of the current policies concerns the schemes introduced in
the NHS to improve the premises of General Practitioners (GPs). There
are two schemes: cost rents and improvement grants. The rules of the
cost rent scheme are complex, but the effect of them is that a GP pur-
chasing new premises receives an annual payment approximately
equal to the interest that they would have paid if they had taken out a
100 per cent mortgage to finance their purchase. This is payable
regardless of how the scheme is actually financed. Improvement grants
are one-off cash payments to GPs to pay for up to two-thirds of the
capital costs of improving surgery premises. They are available only to
GPs who own their own premises.
Now these schemes appeal to both the knight and the knave in the
GP. In each case, participating in the scheme results in an improve-
ment in the premises concerned and thereby in services available to
patients. Hence the knight is satisfied. However, in each case the GP
owns the premises; hence the value of the property is enhanced and
self-interest furthered. Both motivations work in the same direction.
It is no coincidence that these schemes have been very successful.
For instance, a survey by Hambros (1992) found that £620 per annum
per GP was being spent on the maintenance and refurbishment of GP
suites in health centres. Whereas the comparable figure for spending
through the cost rent and improvement grant schemes was £6,500.
The second example of an existing policy again concerns GPs, but
this time in the role that some of them play as GP fund-holders. Under
the scheme, GPs are allowed to keep any surplus on their funds, so
long as they use it for any purpose that is beneficial to patients. Again
this is a scheme that could appeal to the knight and the knave. The
surplus could be invested in improving premises, thus benefiting both
patients and GPs. Or it could be used to purchase new staff, thus eas-
ing the work-load of GPs, and thereby both making them feel better off
and enabling them to provide a better service, or perhaps a more
relaxed one. Again both the knight and the knave are appeased.
A third illustration of a ‘robust’ policy concerns proposals for fund-
ing of long-term care. This I shall discuss in a little more detail. It is
clear that, in order to provide an adequate level of finance for such
care, it will have to rely in part on private resources, both in financial
terms and in terms of time and effort provided by informal carers. The
trick is in some way to mobilise those resources (or to continue to
mobilise them) in a fashion that both generates enough combined
resources (public and private) to provide an adequate level of care for
those who need it, and does not seem punitive in implementation.
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The problem with the current means-tested system in Britain is 
that it meets neither criteria. The level of provision of community care
is universally regarded as inadequate. At the same time the means-test,
which requires the running down of assets until their value falls below
a certain level, seems to penalise those who have had the foresight to
save for their old age, or for their children‘s inheritance, and is thus
viewed as punitive and exploitative. Moreover, and of direct relevance
to the theme of this article, it encourages people to behave knavishly:
to engage in means-test avoidance, adjusting their means in such a
way as to minimise the amount extracted by the state. What should be
a noble act – the state helping those in need – becomes instead a sor-
did set of private activities of dubious morality and, often, even of
doubtful legality.
One way of reforming the system is to introduce the version of legal
welfare described earlier as the obligation alimentaire, under which those
who can afford it are legally obliged to provide financial support to
their relatives in need of care. But this would involve extending the
means-test to relatives. Hence it would encourage people to behave
knavishly, concealing their assets from ‘the means-test man’, as in the
not dissimilar household means-test that disfigured the British welfare
state of the 1930s.
A more attractive alternative is the introduction of what might be
termed a ‘partnership’ or ‘matching’ scheme. This would involve a
minimum level of public funding coupled with a system of matching
grants for expenditure over that minimum. Under this system each per-
son assessed as being in need of care would be entitled to a minimum
level of care met from public funds. This minimum, although adequate,
would be basic. For the payment of care above the minimum, the gov-
ernment would undertake to match £ for £ the resources that individu-
als or their relatives can mobilise for their own care. To keep spending
under control, there would be an overall limit on the total amount of
grant that could be received by any individual.
There are unattractive features of such a scheme. In particular, it
gives more to those who contribute more, and hence it is likely to be
less progressive than any means-tested scheme it might replace.
However, it does have the merit of avoiding any form of compulsory
means-tests, instead encouraging people voluntarily to contribute
resources. More importantly from the point of view of this article, it
could appeal to both the knight and the knave. It appeals to self-inter-
est because it encourages people to provide for themselves. However, it
also encourages relatives and friends to contribute resources to help
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people in need; and it appeals to a more collectivist spirit of altruism
through the use of public money to provide the matching funds.
A similar idea could be applied to pensions. The state could continue
to provide a minimum pension, as now, but also agree to match £ for £
(or at some other rate) any extra provision that an individual made for
him or herself. As in the community care case, there would be a limit
on the total offered to any one person.
The idea as applied to pensions has similar general advantages as
when applied to long-term care. Moreover, in the pensions context it
does not seem to have some of the difficulties of the long-term care
context, particularly that relating to progressivity. There is also already
what could be viewed as a crude form of partnership scheme, in the
form of the various tax reliefs for occupational and private pensions.
But, as is well known, tax relief is both regressive and a blunt instru-
ment: it favours higher rate taxpayers, it does not benefit those who do
not pay tax, it encourages lots of tax-avoidance schemes that have little
to do with the essential tasks of social security, and its cost is difficult
to control.
The total cost of these tax reliefs to the Treasury is now running at
about half the total cost of the state pension. If this money were used
instead for a matching grant system, this would (a) be more progres-
sive, in that it would not favour higher rate taxpayers and would go to
everyone, not just those who pay tax; (b) create a much more sensitive
policy instrument; (c) eliminate incentives for tax avoidance, and
indeed more generally reduce the incentives for knavery of one kind or
another. Finally, of course, it is not resource-consuming; it is simply a
redirection of existing resources in a more progressive and more policy-
sensitive fashion. 
Obviously, partnership ideas such as these require further develop-
ment. However, together with the other examples given, they suggest,
at the least, that the search for policies that are robust to different
assumptions concerning human behaviour is not an impossible one.
C O N C L U S I O N
The old welfare state was largely based on the assumptions that, in
welfare-related situations, people would behave either like knights or
like pawns. This article has discussed ‘new’ forms of welfare, some
based on the assumption that people are knaves, some on the assump-
tion that we can convert knaves into knights, and some on the
assumption that we are ignorant about the mainsprings of human
motivation. The last of these may not have the clarity, or even the
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moral appeal, of some of the others. But they are, I believe, more firmly
grounded than the others and hence should offer a stronger founda-
tion for a social and welfare policy aimed at what we all would like to
achieve: the best possible health, education and welfare of all our citi-
zens in the next century, be they knights, knaves or pawns.
N O T E S
1 This is a revised version of an Inaugural Lecture given at the London School of Economics
on 12 July, 1995, under the title ‘New Visions of Welfare’. I am grateful to Alan Deacon,
Ken Judge, Rodney Lowe, Peter Taylor-Gooby, Nicholas Timmins, to an anonymous referee,
and to many colleagues in the LSE Department of Social Policy and Administration and the
Kings Fund Policy Institute for helpful comments.
2 See, for instance, Glennerster (1995), especially chs. 1 and 2; Lowe (1993), especially chs. 5
and 6; Timmins (1995), especially Part I.
3 It should be noted that not all recent policy developments have taken this form; indeed,
some have gone in the opposite direction, such as the abolition of wages councils in Britain.
However these appear to be exceptions to the more general trends. The abolition of wages
councils, in particular, reflected a political commitment by the government in power that
significantly predated most of the reforms with which we are concerned.
4 Hume was not the first to use the term in this way. That honour is probably due to Bernard
Mandeville, who described an ideal constitution as one ‘which remains unshaken though
most men should prove knaves’ (1731, p. 332, quoted in Pettit, 1996, p. 72).
5 Although I have generally tried to make my language gender-neutral, it is possible that
some of the terminology used in this article (especially that involving the terms knights and
knaves) conjures up a world peopled entirely by men. This is unintended – and, if it distorts
the argument, unfortunate. For it is not implausible that the balance of human motivation
differs significantly between the genders. Hence it might be appropriate to design welfare
policies quite differently depending on the gender balance of the groups involved. This is an
issue that requires more exploration. 
6 Amateur historians of British postwar social policy such as myself are fortunate that three
excellent histories of the welfare state since 1945 have been published recently – one by
Rodney Lowe (1993), one by Howard Glennerster (1995) and one by Nicholas Timmins
(1995) – as has a third edition of Rudolf Klein’s superb study of the development of the
National Health Service (1995). What follows draws heavily on all four.
7 It is useful here to follow Klein (1995, p. 243) and distinguish between attitudes towards
professionals as individuals and as a collectivity. For instance, few of the politicians who
had dealings with the collective organs of the medical profession, such as the British
Medical Association, would have regarded them as public spirited altruists: indeed, in all
probability they would have agreed with Enoch Powell when he wrote ‘the unnerving dis-
covery every Minister of Health makes at or near the outset of his term of office is that the
only subject he is ever destined to discuss with the medical profession is money’ (Powell,
1976, p. 14). However, at the individual level the assumptions were different. For built in to
the concordat that provided the foundations of the NHS was the assumption of clinical free-
dom or autonomy, whereby individual doctors could exercise their professional discretion in
the way they use public resources (Klein, 1995, p. 243).
8 See also Reisman (1977), p. 91.
9 See also Glennerster (1995), p. 69.
10 Chitty (1988), quoted in Lowe (1993) p. 227. This was not just because it was assumed
that teachers knew best: there was a fear of malign government influence. Timmins quotes
the General Secretary of the National Union of Teachers arguing in 1954 that democracy is
best safeguarded by ‘the existence of a quarter of a million teachers who are free to decide
what should be taught and how it should be taught’ (1995, p. 323).
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11 Cf. Anthony Crosland, writing in The Guardian in 1971 (and obviously forsaking his demo-
cratic socialist credentials), who said that the council ‘decides what repairs are to be done,
what pets may be kept, what colour the doors will be painted, what play areas there should
be, where a fence should be put up. The tenant is not consulted. He has no right of appeal.’
Quoted in Timmins (1995), p. 366.
12 Power (1995), especially ch. 19. Also, Timmins illustrates the point with the story of
Nicholas Taylor, an assistant editor at the Architectural Review. He ‘proposed that some evi-
dence should be sought on what people actually wanted, to go with an issue “on the best of
current housing”. He was scornfully dismissed by the proprietor with the words: “But we
KNOW what should be done!”’ (Timmins, 1995, p. 186).
13 For more on Titmuss’s assumptions concerning motivation and behaviour, see Reisman
(1977), including the preface by Robert Pinker.
14 For a useful review of public choice theory, see Mueller (1989).
15 To avoid possible confusion I should make it clear that this is a different terminology from
that used by Robert Goodin when he deals with the broad issue of institutional design. For
him a ‘robust’ strategy is one that is robust to change, involving policies that are ‘capable of
adapting to new situations’ (Goodin, 1996, pp. 40–1). What I call a robust strategy is closer
to what Goodin would term a strategy that shows ‘sensitivity to motivational complexity’
(ibid.).
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